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RESPONSE
Naturalizing natural theology
Helen De Cruz and Johan De Smedt
aFaculty of Humanities, VUUniversity Amsterdam, Amsterdam, TheNetherlands; bDepartment of Philosophy and
Ethics, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
We would like to thank the commenters for their stimulating responses to A Natural History of
Natural Theology. Natural theological arguments, such as the design, cosmological, and moral argu-
ments, have an enduring appeal. In spite of repeated declarations that these arguments are fatally
ﬂawed or even theologically misguided, they keep on popping up, not just in western culture (e.g.,
classical polytheist Greece and Rome, Medieval Christian Europe, early modern Europe, and con-
temporary American and European authors), but also in other belief systems, such as classic
Hindu thought and the medieval Muslim world.
Our book uses tools of the cognitive science of religion (CSR) and other cognitive sciences to explain
the continued cultural success of natural theological arguments. Until recently, CSR has mainly been
employed to explain the cultural salience of ordinary religious beliefs and practices, such as belief in
big gods or the transmission of minimally counterintuitive narratives. The consensus in CSR was that
theology is not subject to the same cognitive constraints as folk religion, but that it is cognitively unna-
tural (in McCauley’s [2011] terminology). There was no research on the cognitive underpinnings of reli-
gious argumentation in natural theology and the philosophy of religion. In fact, some authors, such as
Norenzayan (2013, p. 181), claim that religion and analytic reasoning are incompatible: “apologetics is
doomed to failure as a philosophical enterprise because it fails to capture how our minds accept the
plausibility of religious belief.” Yet apologetics is not doomed by any standard, as the success of popular
books, such asTheGodDelusion (Dawkins, 2006) and TheReason for God (Keller, 2008) indicates. In our
book we argue that the enduring popularity of natural theological arguments is no coincidence, but that it
results from stable features of human cognition, which can be elucidated with the cognitive sciences.
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Both F. LeRon Shults and Jeppe Sinding Jensen point out that cultural and historical factors help
shape natural theological views, next to the individual cognitive propensities that were the focus of
our discussion. Natural theologians assume that the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and
omnibenevolent deity is at least a plausible hypothesis. They use natural theological argumentation
to conﬁrm or disconﬁrm the existence of this being. To explain where this assumption comes from,
we need to look at cultural context: as Jensen rightly points out, “The cultural milieu is where most
humans would acquire their ‘prior assumptions about the existence of God’.”
In our book we focus on individual cognitive biases about the plausibility of religious beliefs (so-
called content biases) to explain the enduring appeal of natural theological arguments. We have
argued that these content biases originate from evolved intuitive ontologies, such as intuitive propen-
sities to seek causes and to identify agents as causes (which underlie the cosmological argument). In
our focus on content biases, we do not deny that social and cultural factors play a role in shaping
natural theological argumentation. While the choice of this focus for the book did not permit us
to fully consider the role of context biases, which look at the social and cultural circumstances
under which representations are transmitted, we discuss them brieﬂy in chapter 8, where we look
at the argument from miracles. As we argue in that chapter, miracle narratives are minimally coun-
terintuitive, which explains why they are retained in memory and have a transmission advantage.
However, this does not explain why people accept some miracle stories as true, and dismiss others
as ﬁctitious. Consider two accounts of miraculous births: the Buddha who was born from his
mother’s side, walked several steps immediately after birth, with lotus ﬂowers springing from
every step, and Jesus whose birth from a virgin was indicated by a star, and announced to shepherds
by a host of singing angels. Christians usually do not accept the Buddha’s birth account, and most
Buddhists reject Jesus’ birth narrative. The reason for this difference is that Buddhists are part of a
religious group where the Buddha’s birth story is regarded as true, whereas Christians are part of a
cultural tradition that regards the virgin birth of Jesus as veridical. A recent study by Corriveau,
Chen, and Harris (2015) showed that young children from Christian households are more likely
to accept miracle stories (drawn from biblical narratives) than children from secular households.
This study has sometimes been taken to demonstrate that children from religious households are
more gullible, whereas it actually establishes that children are sensitive to context biases of their cul-
ture, and thus more readily accept an explanation invoking God if they receive frequent testimony
that God exists, as happens in Christian households. Like Jensen, we hold that a full explanation of
people’s prior assumptions about the plausibility of God’s existence needs to take such cultural fac-
tors into account. However, contra Jensen, we maintain that even at this higher level of explanation,
cognitive science is useful: the evolved propensity of children and adults to readily trust in testimony
(see chapter 8 for details) can explain why people accept theological claims and miracle stories from
their own traditions as factual.
We agree with Jensen that “[v]ery few people have direct, intuitive beliefs based on perceptions of
superhuman agents,” but we disagree with his claim that immediately follows, namely that “for all
others it is reﬂective beliefs all the way down.” Humans sometimes hold highly arcane reﬂective
beliefs that have no grounding in intuition, and that are purely testimony-based, such as “Every
elementary particle or quantic entity exhibits the properties of both particles and waves” or “The Tri-
nitarian God of Christianity has one substance but consists of three persons.” Typically, these are
metarepresentations that have been acquired through education. However, most beliefs, including
most religious beliefs, are supported by intuitions that make them plausible. For instance, the
view that God created the world (a reﬂective belief) is supported by the teleology humans spon-
taneously discern in their environment (a set of intuitive beliefs). Although the views that natural
theologians and philosophers of religion argue for are reﬂective, the intuitions that serve as premises
in their arguments are intuitive.
Jensen does not acknowledge the continued role of intuitive modes of cognition in the formation
and transmission of religious beliefs. He argues that “the cognitive science of religion may point to
some important generative mental mechanisms and their properties but it still does not really
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provide insights into the selective mechanism on the socio-cultural levels.” In epidemiological
models of cultural transmission (e.g., Sperber, 1996), which are at the basis of a lot of CSR theorizing
(e.g., Boyer, 2002), both intuitive ontologies and culturally transmitted representations are required
to explain the differential cultural success of representations. In the cultural institutions where natu-
ral theology is conducted, such as monasteries and universities, humans are still subject to content
biases: some ideas are more in line with their intuitions, and thus, all things considered, have a trans-
mission advantage. As we have argued, the extent to which natural theological arguments are suc-
cessful depends crucially on how plausible they seem, and the plausibility of premises is
inﬂuenced to an important extent by content biases.
Shults also argues for the prominence of cultural factors in natural theology. He wants to go a step
further than Jensen, recommending that natural theologians and philosophers of religion re-evaluate
their prior assumptions in the light of the fact that they are inﬂuenced by their cultural milieu, in a
way that makes their arguments unreliable:
Supernatural agent abductions are not simply prior “assumptions” or “probabilities,” but biased hypotheses
powerfully protected from critique by ongoing participation in the shared imaginative engagement of a particu-
lar religious coalition, wherein one is constantly required to send credible and costly signals of commitment to
other in-group members.
We disagree with the claim that natural theological arguments are mainly written with the aim of
signaling commitment to in-group members. To the contrary, we found that many natural theolo-
gical arguments are formulated in a context of intellectual diversity, in particular one where natur-
alistic worldviews are on the rise. As we note in chapter 1, early natural theological arguments tended
to emerge in predominantly theistic cultures which fostered non-theistic alternative accounts of rea-
lity, such as atomism in ancient Greece and Rome, or Sāmkhya, a rationalist school of Hinduism that
did not afﬁrm the existence of gods and denied them explicitly as ﬁnal cause. The new outburst of
natural theology in analytic philosophy of religion since the 1960s can also be seen as a countermove-
ment to the rising inﬂuence of naturalism in philosophy and everyday life.
While natural theological arguments are not primarily signals of commitment to in-group mem-
bers, cultural and historical factors can also explain why these arguments are mainly formulated to
support the existence of God (or in polytheistic traditions, the gods), rather than the actuality of tree
spirits, trolls, or mermaids. In past societies, natural theologians also considered religious practices
and ideas that we would now deem frivolous. For instance, Cicero (45 BC/1923) defended using ani-
mal entrails for divination purposes and Augustine (5th century/1972, 5th century, book XIV, chap-
ter 24) argued that humans before the fall had perfect control over their bodies, including the ability
to fart musically without any noxious smell. That these and other questions are no longer seen as
worthy of natural theological reﬂection is a historical contingency. Shults speculates that “most edu-
cated people in general” consider claims “about UFO abductions, the detection of spirit-guides at a
séance, celestial forces fulﬁlling astrological predictions, or the presence of trolls in the Norwegian
forest” as “bunk.”He is underestimating the diversity of supernatural beliefs even in educated adults.
After all, only about 50% of science majors surveyed at an American public university believe
astrology is not scientiﬁc, and 78% of the undergraduates there believe that astrology is at least to
some extent scientiﬁc (Sugarman, Impey, Buxner, & Antonellis, 2011). Why then are gods given a
pass? We think there is no principled reason why natural theologians should limit their discussions
to narrow thin concepts of God. Clearly, there is a poverty of topics in natural theology and in phil-
osophy of religion more generally. Due to their Christian or post-Christian background, philoso-
phers of religion tend to regard generic theism, Christian theism, and scientiﬁc naturalism as the
default options, and concentrate on these in their argumentation, leaving aside a rich diversity of
views from, for example, Mormonism, Jainism, and Wicca.
Two commentators, AdamGreen and Pierre Liénard, make explicit comparisons between reason-
ing in natural theology and models of scientiﬁc inference in the philosophy of science. Liénard inves-
tigates one aspect of our book, namely “the extent to which natural theological arguments might be
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strengthened (or undermined) by the recognition of the cognitive origins of natural theological intui-
tions.” He draws on the philosophy of science of Karl Popper to raise the more general question of
whether matters of origin can say anything about the justiﬁcation of a given belief.
In our discussion of general debunking arguments in chapter 9, we point out that beliefs that
result from the normal functioning of evolved cognitive mechanisms are usually world-sensitive,
i.e., they are sensitive to states of the world. Given the high metabolic costs of human brains,
and given that beliefs inﬂuence how organisms interact with the world, one can predict that the
majority of human cognitive capacities will track ecologically relevant properties. However, we
do not go on to conclude, as Liénard suggests, that “[b]eliefs about God have their origins in intui-
tions naturally generated by human cognitive mechanisms. Hence, the probability of those beliefs
to be justiﬁed is reasonably high.” Rather, we stick to the modest conclusion that generalized
debunking arguments, which aim to cast doubt on our cognitive capacities, do not work. Our
claim that beliefs are generally world-sensitive does not mean that the cognitive mechanisms
that shape religious beliefs are reliable in the natural theological and philosophical contexts in
which they are deployed.
Liénard takes color vision as an example of what we can learn from the origins of a belief for its
justiﬁcation. Thanks to our understanding of the cognitive processes involved in color vision (e.g.,
the color receptors in the eye, processing by the primary visual cortex, processes involved in main-
taining color constancy), we get an insight into how we can form the false but adaptive belief that
colors are inherent properties of objects. While this belief is intuitive, it is not the spontaneous output
of evolved cognitive capacities (as Liénard seems to hold). What we do form spontaneously are
beliefs such as “ripe strawberries are red” and “ravens are black.” The generalization that colors
are an inherent property of objects is not a belief we form spontaneously, but a philosophical thesis
formulated by Aristotle, and reﬁned by medieval scholastic philosophers (Chirimuuta, 2015, p. 20).
This philosophical view was unchallenged until the early modern period because it aligns well with
our intuitions. The belief that ripe strawberries are red is a good example of a world-sensitive belief:
redness in fruit indicates ripeness; it is a proxy for the sugars that can be found in it, and thus the
nutritional value of the fruit, which probably explains why color receptors that distinguish green
from red light waves had a selective advantage in frugivorous diurnal primates. To this day, realism
about colors continues to be a viable position in the philosophy of perception. Unlike Liénard, many
philosophers assume that evolutionary facts about color perception are relevant to this discussion
(see Chirimuuta, 2015 for an overview).
The question of the relationship between the context of discovery and the context of justiﬁcation
was prominent in mid-twentieth-century philosophy of science. Popper did not think the context of
discovery could say much about the context of justiﬁcation because he believed that, while the pro-
cesses of scientiﬁc discovery were perhaps of interest to empirical psychology, they were not philo-
sophically relevant. Since the 1980s, philosophers of science have questioned whether the strict
segregation between discovery and justiﬁcation can be maintained. For instance, feminist philoso-
phers of science, such as Helen Longino (1990), have argued that the subjective factors that play a
role in scientiﬁc discoveries inﬂuence scientiﬁc results.
We are puzzled by Liénard’s suggestion that natural theologians should adopt a falsiﬁcatory strat-
egy. Natural theology is not a science, and does not resemble the kinds of sciences (mainly physics)
that stood model for Popper’s philosophical reﬂections. Popper even maintained that biology was
not a science, and only decades later reluctantly acknowledged that it also has laws (Popper,
1978). If natural theology were to emulate the sciences – not something we would recommend –
it would have to model itself on historical sciences (e.g., paleoanthropology, archaeology), not on
physics or chemistry. However, the historical sciences cannot use falsiﬁcation because this strategy
requires universal laws, which are rarely invoked in historical disciplines. Instead, historical scientists
use a combination of induction and abduction to reach their conclusions. For example, a thin glob-
ally attested layer of volcanic ash containing iridium was regarded as decisive evidence that a large
asteroid impact was responsible for the Cretaceous–Tertiary mass extinction about 65 million years
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ago (which, among others, wiped out the dinosaurs). This ﬁnding did not falsify other hypotheses,
such as contagious diseases or global climate change, but it did present a decisive piece of evidence in
favor of the asteroid hypothesis. Similarly, natural theologians seldom see a piece of evidence as a
decisive falsiﬁcation, but rather see it as strong evidence (a “smoking gun,” in Cleland’s [2002] ter-
minology) that a given hypothesis is more likely than its competitors. For example, the ﬁne-tuning of
cosmological constants and physical laws is often taken as a smoking gun in favor of a design
hypothesis of the universe, whereas suffering in humans and other sentient beings is often counted
as evidence against it.
Adam Green examines our discussion of the design and cosmological arguments (chapters 4 and
5 respectively). Building on earlier work (Green, 2015), he suggests that natural theology is a form of
bottom-up model-based reasoning. In chapter 4, we raise a problem for the design argument:
humans do not automatically perceive design, rather they attribute it on the basis of background
assumptions. Both adults and young children take the history of objects into account when they
decide whether they were designed. For instance, when they are shown objects and are given two
divergent reports of how these came into being, either by accident (e.g., a strip of cloth was uninten-
tionally caught in a machine, which resulted in holes punched in the cloth at regular intervals) or by
design (e.g., a person carefully cut holes at regular intervals with a pair of scissors), participants are
more prone to call this object a belt if they think it was intentionally created (Gelman & Bloom,
2000). On the other hand, adults and children who heard the accidental story thought it was a
strip of cloth with holes in. We argue that since design is not something one can automatically per-
ceive, but that one infers on the basis of background assumptions, natural theologians beg the ques-
tion when they use the design argument to prove the existence of a divine designer.
Green proposes that this move is not problematic, since “[a] background model can factor into a
bottom-up argument without the giver of the argument begging the question.” He draws an analogy
with someone who uses his grandfather’s map, rather than a recent one, to navigate a national park.
That person uses a lot of background assumptions but she is not committed to them, and indeed can
test the accuracy of the map by surveying the terrain. Similarly, “[a]dopting a design stance might
reﬂect the background and the purposes of the natural theologian without factoring in in any elicit
way.” Some critics of the design argument have indeed worked within the assumptions of natural
theology, as in Green’s analogy of the use of the old map to test its accuracy. For instance, Sarkar
(2011) argues that one would expect some redundancy to be built into natural systems if they are
intelligently designed: planes have multiple engines, buildings have ﬁre exits. In his view, the absence
of such redundancy indicates lack of intelligent design. However, other critics question the usefulness
of an old map. Hume (1779), for example, queried whether we can apply design intuitions to natural
objects, given that these intuitions are normally triggered by artifacts, which have known designers.
To further explore the map analogy, the intuitions that natural theologians rely on are an ancient
map we inherited from our ancestors (i.e., evolved intuitions about design, causation, morality,
etc.), that is being used for a terrain that is quite distinct from its original purpose, namely a religion
such as Christianity. Critics of natural theology would not regard natural theological intuitions as
grandfather’s map – which after all still bears some semblance to the terrain it is supposed to
map, since that was its original function – but rather as a map for an entirely different geological
formation.
Kelly James Clark focuses on the epistemic status of intuitions, a topic that occurs throughout our
book, especially in chapters 2, 4, 5, and 9. He points out that the use of intuitions in natural theology
is similar to their use in other philosophical domains, such as ethics or epistemology. This gives rise
to the following parity argument (explicitly formulated by Clark as follows, even though only
implicitly present in our book): “if it is okay for philosophers to rely on such intuitions in other
areas of philosophy (and they do), then it is okay for philosophers to rely on intuitions in the phil-
osophy of religion.” Clark argues (and we agree) that this does not establish that such practices are
rational – at best it shows that philosophers of religion are not more irrational than ethicists and
epistemologists.
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This raises the question of how we can establish whether philosophical intuitions are reliable. This
is an enduring question in metaphilosophy. For instance, Robert Cummins (1998) argues pessimis-
tically that philosophers, unlike scientists, do not have independent empirical techniques to conﬁrm
or disconﬁrm their intuitions, i.e., they have no “test key.” Philosophers can use thought experiments
and arguments, but ultimately they can at best establish consensus. Consensus and strength of intui-
tions are correlated, but consensus by itself is not a guide for true beliefs. Clark voices this concern as
follows: “Here is a way to put the problem: physicists can test and afﬁrm/reject intuitions, philoso-
phers cannot.”
As we see it, there are at least two ways to tackle this problem. The ﬁrst is to look at the role of
intuitions in scientiﬁc reasoning. A number of metaphysical assumptions needed to practice science
cannot be directly tested, such as that measurements are repeatable, that contingent events (except
apparently at the quantum level) require external causes for them to occur, that, under some con-
ditions, correlation does indicate causation. Thus, the scientiﬁc enterprise seems to be subject to
similar problems as philosophy. One could object to this line of reasoning that scientists do not
need to be committed to these metaphysical assumptions (something that Liénard voices in his com-
ment). After all, our causal intuitions about everyday, middle-sized objects are no longer applied
within the domain of quantum physics. Science is not unique in reaching counterintuitive con-
clusions. As Eric Schwitzgebel (2014) points out, metaphysicians start out with mundane, banal
observations, such as that we use numbers to denote physical arrangements in our environment
(e.g., two bicycles, two bananas). However, using those observations and philosophical reasoning,
they end up with very strange beliefs that do not align with common sense, such as that the number
two is an abstract entity that exists outside of space time. So philosophers and scientists are able to
reach radically counterintuitive conclusions, which indicates that philosophers are not bound by
their intuitions.
Another way to respond to the charge that philosophers cannot know how reliable their intuitions
are is to take a naturalistic approach, which one of us (De Cruz, 2015) has recently advocated. Phi-
losophers can look at the way intuitions function in their ordinary ecological contexts to get an idea
about their reliability. For example, we commonly use intuitions in the domain of epistemology to
gauge whether someone knows or merely believes something. In Gettier cases, people have justiﬁed
and true beliefs. For example, Fred believes it is 3 o’clock in the afternoon based on a glance at his
wristwatch. It really happens to be 3 PM, but his watch stopped functioning exactly 12 hours ago. In
scenarios like these, philosophers and laypeople (see Nagel, San Juan, & Mar, 2013) judge that Fred
does not have knowledge, although his beliefs are both true and justiﬁed. The intuitions elicited in
Gettier cases are products of our intuitive psychology (theory of mind), and draw on our ability to
attribute beliefs and other mental states to others. Since it would be evolutionarily advantageous to
distinguish knowledge from an accidentally (lucky) true belief, we can expect that intuitions that
underlie knowledge claims in epistemology are quite reliable. While we agree with Clark that it is
difﬁcult to test the soundness of intuitions in philosophy, we think that not all philosophical intui-
tions lie outside the scope of a naturalistic investigation into their reliability.
Unfortunately, as we detail in chapter 9, this way of validating intuitions does not work for natural
theology due to the generality problem. For example, it is not clear that one is justiﬁed in extending a
claim that works well in our everyday environment (e.g., all contingent events require an external
cause for their existence) to the universe at large. Given that natural theologians routinely generalize
everyday intuitions beyond the realm of common sense, it is hard to determine in a principled way
whether such extrapolations are warranted.
By way of conclusion, our book can be situated in philosophy of cognitive science, particularly
philosophy of cognitive science of religion. Thus, our aims are somewhat different from those of
natural theologians and philosophers of religion. While they address questions about the ultimate
nature of reality, we examine the sources of intuitions that drive natural theological arguments,
thus also shedding light on the rationality of this enterprise.
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